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GAG ORDERS ON CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
On September 5, 1975, Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme was arrested
in Sacramento, California, for attempting to assassinate President Ger-
ald R. Ford. Four days later, Federal Judge Thomas J. MacBride in the
Eastern District of California issued a broad protective order proscribing
the extrajudicial statements of a number of trial participants, including
the defendant.1 The following day, a local newspaper described the
1. See United States v. Fromme, Crim. No. S-75-451 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 9, 1975).
The order read as follows: "Because of the sensitive nature of this case and in order to
strike a balance between the Constitutional mandate of a free press and the Constitutional
right of all persons to a fair trial:
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following named persons and the officers,
employees, agents and representatives of the following named federal, state, county and
city law enforcement agencies are hereby enjoined from making any comment or state-
ment to any news media representative, or to any other person, concerning any matters
of evidence or concerning any aspect of the investigation in this case into the alleged at-
tempted assassination of the President of the United States of America, Gerald R. Ford,
on September 5, 1975, in Sacramento, California:
"Defendant Lynette Alice Fromme
"Attorney representing defendant Lynette Alice Fromme
"Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California
'United States Department of Justice
"Federal Bureau of Investigation
"United States Secret Service
'United States Marshal
"Any other federal law enforcement agency not specifically named above
"Sacramento County Sheriff's Department
"Sacramento Police Department
"Office of the Federal Defender
"United States Clerk's office for this District
"All persons called as witnesses before the Grand Jury of this court in this case.
"This order is not intended to preclude the United States Attorney, or his deputies
or assistants, from announcing whether the Grand Jury has returned an indictment in
this matter, nor is it intended to preclude the defendant, or defendant's attorney, the
United States Attorney, or his agents and employees, or any other federal agency
engaged in the investigation of said matter, from questioning and receiving answers from
witnesses who may happen to be officers, employees or agents or any of the above
named federal, state, county or city law enforcement agencies, who may be possessed of
evidence connected with this case or the investigation of this case.
"All violators will be subject to the contempt power of this Court."
Exactly one month after the protective order was issued in the Fromme case, a
federal judge in the Northern District of California issued a gag order in the case of
Steven Soliah. Soliah was accused of harboring a known federal fugitive, Patricia
Hearst. This second order excluded the defendant and was more narrowly drawn. See
United States v. Soliah, Crim. No. 75-675 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 9, 1975).
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order as "unusual."2 The adjective was correct only with reference to
federal courts. While the inclusion of criminal defendants in protective
orders is rare in federal courts,8 such gag orders are frequently issued by
California trial judges. 4
Upon cursory consideration, it might seem reasonable for a trial
court to include the defendant5 in a gag order. The defendant, after all,
is one of the trial participants. The defendant's position under such a
gag order, however, is distinct from that of the other trial participants6
for two reasons. First, other trial participants are third parties whose
comments are being restrained in order to protect the defendant's sixth
2. See Sacramento Bee, Sept. 10, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 990 (1969); McLucas v. Palmer, 309 F. Supp. 1353 (D. Conn. 1970); United States
v. Chase, 309 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ill. 1970); cf. United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 6
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (supporting the principle of a gag order
covering the defendant).
4. See Warren & Abell, Free Press-Fair Trial: The "Gag Order," A California
Aberration, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 51, 56, 62 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Warren & Abell].
Other states have not followed California's example. For a decision voicing support for
the principle, however, see State v. Schmid, 109 Ariz. 349, 354, 509 P.2d 619, 624
(1973).
5. Recently in the Sixth Circuit a gag order covering the parties in a civil action
was found constitutionally impermissible. See CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 240-41
(6th Cir. 1975). While many of the issues involved in gag orders covering parties in a
civil action are the same as those raised by protective orders covering the defendant, this
note will limit its discussion to gag orders on criminal defendants.
6. Surprisingly little has been written on gag orders covering either the defendant
or other trial participants. For discussions of gag orders in the context of free press and
fair trial see Warren & Abell, supra note 4; 51 CHL-KENT L. Rav. 597 (1974); 6 Hgav.
Civ. RIGHms-CiV. LiB. L. REv. 595 (1971); 31 Omo ST. L.J. 388 (1970). The
disproportionate amount of material on press restrictions in comparison with the number
of articles on gag orders covering trial participants is interesting considering a recent
tabulation showing many more protective orders are issued restricting trial participants
than are issued restraining the media. See Landau, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due
Process Proposal, The Challenge of the Communications Media, 62 A.B.A.J. 55, 57
(1976).
Cases involving witnesses, defense attorneys, and prosecutors have not given any
clear indication of when and if gag orders are constitutional. In one case involving
protective orders on grand jury witnesses, the court found the order overly broad. See
King v. Jones, 319 F. Supp. 653, 658 (N.D. Ohio 1970). Orders proscribing the
statements of public prosecutors were upheld in Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138,
106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973) and in In re Kinlein, 15 Md. App. 625, 292 A.2d 749 (1972).
Three Seventh Circuit cases tested the constitutionality of protective orders as applied to
defense attorneys. In the first two cases, the court required specific facts showing an
imminent threat to a fair trial and rejected the orders as violative of the first amendment.
See In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th
Cir. 1970). In the third case considering gag orders on defense attorneys, the court
recently held a no comment rule promulgated by the local district and the disciplinary
committee of the bar association unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See Chicago
Council v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
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amendment right to a fair trial. Proscribing the defendant's speech,
however, creates a conflict between two of his own personal rights, his
sixth amendment guarantee to a fair trial and his first amendment right
to freedom of expression. Second, the defendant is not normally subject
to the court's discipline outside of the courtroom. In contrast, the other
trial participants are subject to the court's control because they are
officers of the court. Therefore, the unique position of the defendant
requires a distinct legal justification for his inclusion in a gag order.
Both trial and appellate courts, however, have often failed to recognize
the need to distinguish the defendant from other trial participants.
The primary purpose of this note is to analyze the legal justification
for including a criminal defendant in a gag order. It will be contended
that no legal justification exists for limiting the defendant's first
amendment right to speak freely on any issue, including the facts
and circumstances surrounding the crime for which he has been indict-
ed. A subsidiary purpose of this note is to examine the procedural and
substantive standards presently being used by the courts in determining
whether a gag order covering the defendant is needed or required. The
author's conclusion in this regard is that even if a legal justification for
the order is established, the current procedural and substantive stan-
dards are inadequate, given the nature of the defendant's rights which
are involved.
These two points will be developed in four main steps. The first
will summarize the historical factors leading up to the approval by the
Supreme Court in 1966 of the gag order as a tool of modem 'criminal
procedure. The second step will consider the way in which two federal
circuit courts and the California court of appeal have dealt with gag
orders covering the defendant since the Supreme Court authorized their
use. The third step will focus on the legal justification for including the
defendant in a gag order by considering in turn the court's contempt
power over the defendant and the justifications advanced for using this
power. The final step, conceding for the purpose of argument that a
justification exists, will discuss the minimum procedural and substantive
standards which should be observed before any gag order is issued
covering the defendant.
Gag Orders as a Solution to a Conflict Between the
First and Sixth Amendments
The justification for all gag orders is the protection of the fair trial
right guaranteed by the sixth amendment. By its very nature, however,
a gag order infringes on the first amendment rights of the person whose
extrajudicial statements are proscribed. The inherent conflict between
these two fundamental rights was specifically addressed in 1965, when
the Supreme Court announced that the fair trial right was more funda-
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mental' than the right of free speech. One year later, the Court, in
declining to suppress media comment directly, decided to deal with the
problem of prejudicial publicity by authorizing the proscription of the
extrajudicial comments of various trial participants. 8
Rise in Importance of the Sixth Amendment
The first amendment of the Constitution requires that "Congress
shall make no laws. . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press
. ... " The express restriction is on the power of Congress, not on the
power of the various states, and during the 19th and early 20th cen-
turies, state courts felt free to use their contempt power to punish
newspapers and individuals for making public comment on pending
cases.9 In 1925, however, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that the first amendment is applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment.10
Sixteen years later, the Court was called upon to determine the
constitutionality of a state court's use of the contempt power to punish
individuals and publishers for comments made about pending cases. In
Bridges v. California," a labor leader had been held in contempt
because of a telegram he had sent to the secretary of labor and had later
given to the press criti&izing the actions of a state court. 2 In the
companion case of Times-Mirror Co. v. California,13 a newspaper pub-
lisher had been convicted of contempt for an article labeling the defend-
ants "gorillas" and arguing against the granting of probation. The
California Supreme Court had affirmed both convictions. 4 Reversing
the decisions, the United States Supreme Court found the publications
had not constituted a "clear and present danger" to the administration of
justice. 5 While Justice Black recognized the importance of the fair
trial principle,' 6 he concluded that before a court could use the con-
tempt power to punish for public comment on a pending case, "the
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high ....
7. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
8. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966).
9. See Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States Since the
Federal Contempt Statute, 28 COLUM. L. Rxv. 525 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Nelles &
King].
10. New York v. Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
11. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
12. See id. at 275-78.
13. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
14. See Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Ct., 15 Cal. 2d 99, 98 P.2d 1029 (1940);
Bridges v. Superior Ct., 14 Cal. 2d 464, 94 P.2d 983 (1939).
15. See 314 U.S. at 263.
16. See id. at 260.
17. Id. at 263.
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A series of United States Supreme Court decisions between 1946
and 1961 supported the reasonable conclusion from Bridges that first
amendment supremacy in the area of public comment on pending cases
was secure. In Pennekamp v. Florida,'8 the publisher of a cartoon
criticizing the actions of a state court had been convicted of contempt.
The Court struck down the citation, saying:
In the borderline instances where it is difficult to say upon which
side the alleged offense falls, we think the specific freedom of pub-
lic comment should weigh heavily against a possible tendency to
influence pending cases. Freedom of discussion should be given
the widest range compatible with the essential requirement of the
fair and orderly administration of justice. 19
One year later, the Court in Craig v. Harney20 struck down another
contempt conviction. A news article and editorial had attacked a judge
and the actions of a state court during a pending case. The Court said
of the contempt power:
The history of the power to punish for contempt. . . and the un-
equivocal command of the First Amendment serve as constant re-
minders that freedom of speech and of the press should not be
impaired through the exercise of that power, unless there is no
doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice. 2 '
Again, in Wood v. Georgia,22 when a sheriff had issued a press state-
ment criticizing a judge while the grand jury was sitting, the Court held
the resulting contempt conviction violative of the first amendment. Thus
by 1962, the United States Supreme Court had ruled four times28 that a
court's contempt power should be used to prohibit public comment on a
pending case only when there is a clear and present danger to a fair
trial.24 It was a stringent test giving great weight to first amendment
freedoms.
In 1961, however, the Court was presented with a different per-
spective on the conflict between first amendment freedoms and fair trial
18. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
19. Id. at 347.
20. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
21. Id. at 373.
22. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
23. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367
(1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941).
24. None of these cases involved jury trials. The court in Wood v. Georgia said,
"Moreover we need not pause here to consider the variant factors that would be present
in a case involving a petit jury." 370 U.S. at 389. Earlier, however, the court had
refused to grant certiorari in a jury case in which a state court had reversed the contempt
citation using the clear and present danger test. See Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193
Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
rights.2 5 The sixth amendment guarantee of a trial by an "impartial
jury" provides the accused with the implicit right to a fair trial.26 With
wide public comment on pending cases allowed, what recourse did a
defendant have when publicity so prejudiced his case as to violate his
sixth amendment right to an impartial jury? The Court in Irvin v.
Dowd17 addressed this problem by holding that failure to provide a fair
trial because of prejudicial publicity was a denial of due process of law.
In Irvin, adverse local publicity led the accused to request a change of
venue. Although the defendant's request was granted, the case was
tried in a neighboring county equally infected with the prejudicial
publicity, and the defendant's requests for additional changes in venue
were denied.28 The defendant was eventually convicted by what voir
dire had shown to be a prejudiced jury.29 The trial court's refusal to
grant the further change of venue was held to be reversible error.
Two years later, in Rideau v. Louisiana,s0 the Court reversed
another conviction on the basis that adverse publicity had denied the
defendant due process. An interview between the sheriff and the
defendant in which the defendant had confessed was broadcast three
times over a local television station. The Court found that the trial
court's refusal to grant a further change of venue under the circum-
stances of a televised confession was a denial of due process even
without a showing that the adverse publicity had affected the jury.3
The decision in Irvin v. Dowd and Rideau v. Louisiana were in
favor of sixth amendment rights, not against first amendment guaran-
tees. By shifting the emphasis to the fair trial right, however, these
decisions raised doubts as to the outcome of further confrontations
between these two amendments. At least one member of the Court in
Irvin was worried about the increased number of appeals and writs of
habeas corpus based on the claim that prejudicial publicity had de-
stroyed the right to a fair trial.32
25. See Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
26. The sixth amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed...." The United States Supreme Court
has interpreted the requirement of an impartial jury to mean that "the conclusions to be
reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not
by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print." Patterson v. Colorado
ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
These sixth amendment rights are applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
27. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
28. Id. at 720.
29. Id. at 727.
30. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
31. See id. at 726.
32. See id. at 730 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Finally, in 1965, portions of a widely publicized trial were televised
live. The Court in Estes v. Texas83 reversed the conviction, holding that
the prejudice inherent in the use of television in the courtroom was a
denial of due process.34 More pertinently, the Court said, "[Tihe
atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial-the most funda-
mental of all freedoms-must be maintained at all costs. '35 This dictum
was to become the constitutional underpinning for gag orders. The rule
was to emerge that first amendment rights to freedom of expression
were to be subordinate to sixth amendment guarantees whenever the
exercise of freedom of expression interfered with the guarantee of a fair
trial.36
The reason behind this shift in emphasis from first amendment
rights to sixth amendment guarantees can only be surmised. One theory
is the advent of television increased the scope and volume of prejudicial
publicity, thereby causing more frequent and substantial infringements
of sixth amendment rights.3 7 Certainly television was the major factor
in the Court's reversals in Rideau and Estes.8 Nevertheless, the preju-
dicial publicity which affects rights in a fair trial is the local publicity in
the area from which the jury is drawn. Nationwide television coverage
of highly controversial jury trials does not therefore necessarily affect
prospective jurors and does not explain the Court's new attitude. Al-
though local television provided an additional dimension to media cov-
erage, a better explanation for the rise in the importance of the sixth
amendment is the applicability of the sixth amendment to the states
through the fourteenth39 and the Warren Court's overriding concern for
the rights of criminal defendants.40
Whatever the cause for the increased importance accorded the
sixth amendment, the Court's declaration in Estes that the right to a fair
33. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
34. See id. at 544.
35. Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
36. For application of the rule see United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666-67
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); Allegrezza v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal. App.
3d 948, 951-52, 121 Cal. Rptr. 245, 247-48 (1975).
37. For a discussion of the impact of television on a jury trial see Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 544-50 (1965). See also Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33
Rocst MT. L. Rav. 1 (1960).
38. In Rideau, for example, the Court suggested that the broadcast of the defend-
ant's confession over local television was in fact his trial. See 373 U.S. at 726-27.
39. The right to a public trial was held applicable to the states in 1948. See In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). Other parts of the sixth amendment were held applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment during the 1960's. See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
40. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
July 197,61
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
trial must be "maintained at all costs" 41 introduced a variety of problems
for appellate courts. With adverse publicity virtually unchecked by the
courts, this new emphasis on sixth amendment rights not only provided
the accused with needed protection, but also provided the convicted
defendant and his attorney with a usable claim on appeal. The Court
voiced concern about the increasing number of defendants seeking
reversals on the basis of prejudicial publicity.42  The inherent conflict
between first and sixth amendment rights was accentuated by the assas-
sination of President John F. Kennedy and its aftermath. The media
coverage there caused at least one legal scholar to wonder openly
whether Lee Harvey Oswald could have received a fair trial anywhere in
the United States.4" While this was an extreme case, it pointed out the
dilemma created by guaranteeing protection to both freedom of the
press and fair trial rights. Clearly some compromise was inevitable.
Given the Court's declaration that the sixth amendment right was to be
"maintained at all costs," it was logically only a matter of time before
some first amendment freedoms would be restricted.
The Supreme Court Sets the Stage-Sheppard v. Maxwell:
The Court in Estes v. Texas indicated that sixth amendment rights
were to take precedence over first amendment freedoms. How and
when to implement such a rule remained unclear. One year after the
decision in Estes, however, the Court had an opportunity to provide
broad guidelines for a trial court confronted with the problem of preju-
dicial publicity.44
Dr. Sam Sheppard had been convicted of the murder of his wife in
an atmosphere best described by an Ohio Supreme Court justice hearing
the case on appeal:
Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were combined in
this case in such a manner as to intrigue and captivate the public
fancy to a degree perhaps unparalleled in recent annals. Through-
out the preindictment investigation, the subsequent legal skirmishes
and the nine-week trial, circulation conscious editors catered to the
insatiable interest of the American public in the bizarre. . . . In
this atmosphere of a 'Roman holiday' for the news media, Sam
Sheppard stood trial for his life.45
41. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
42. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
43. See Statement by the Board of Governors of the American Bar Ass'n, Dec. 7,
1963, cited in Powell, The Right to a Fair Trial, 51 A.B.A.J. 534, 535 n.2 (1965). For
a suggestion that the only alternative would have been to release Oswald see Statement
by Edwin N. Griswold, Dean of Harvard Law School, in Griswold, Responsibility of the
Legal Profession, HARvAPn TODAY, Jan. 1965, at 9.
44. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
45. State v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 294, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1956).
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The Court reversed Sheppard's conviction on the basis of the trial
judge's failure to control the publicity surrounding the trial.46 In
dictum, the Court recommended a variety of methods a judge might use
to preserve a defendant's right to a fair trial. These included stricter
rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen, isolation of
witnesses, and the control of leaks to the press.4 7 The recommenda-
tions, however, stopped short of direct control of the media. Instead the
Court implied that the same result could be accomplished by indirec-
tion.48  By muzzling the effective sources of publicity, a judge could
control what went into print without resorting to suppression of the
press. The Court therefore sanctioned the proscription of extrajudicial
statements by trial participants.49  Specifically, the Court said, "[he
trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any
lawyer, party, witness or court official which divulged prejudicial
matters . ... 50 This position was emphasized later in the opinion
when the Court said, "Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the
accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under
the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate [the trial
court's] function."5 1  These dicta clearly permitted a trial court to
proscribe the accused's extrajudicial statements, and from this authoriza-
tion has emerged the use of protective orders, commonly referred to as
gag orders.
The rationale for protective orders covering trial participants other
than the accused is clear. The Court in Sheppard said:
Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impar-
trial jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness
of modem communications and the difficulties of effacing prejudi-
cial publicity from the minds of jurors, the trial courts must take
strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against
the accused. 52
The above rationale for gag orders does not justify proscribing the
defendant's own extrajudicial statements, however. The right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury and the right to freedom of expression are both
rights personal to the accused. It seems unlikely the Court intended
that the defendant's own constitutional guarantees were to be weighed
against each other. Nevertheless, the Court in Sheppard failed to
distinguish the accused's position under a gag order from that of other
trial participants. 5
46. See 384 U.S. at 354-58.
47. Id. at 358-61.
48. For a discussion of this idea see Warren & Abell, supra note 4, at 74-75.
49. See 384 U.S. at 361.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 363.
52. Id. at 362.
53. At one point in the opinion, however, in discussing proposed efforts to limit
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
In failing to distinguish the defendant's position, the Court neglect-
ed to establish a legal justification for the proscription of the accused's
extrajudicial statements. While other trial participants can be covered
by gag orders because their first amendment rights are outweighed by
the defendant's sixth amendment guarantees, this justification would not
seem to apply to the defendant. Other trial participants are within the
court's disciplinary powers and can be controlled simply because of their
relationship to the court or the criminal justice system, 54 but the accused
is not within these ordinary disciplinary powers.5 5 Although the Court
in Sheppard said that control was "concededly within the court's pow-
er, 356 the decision did not clarify the scope of the power to enforce a gag
order covering the defendant.
In addition, the Court in Sheppard failed to provide any clue as to
what substantive and procedural safeguards are necessary before a trial
judge is justified in issuing such a gag order.5" Was the Bridges test of
a clear and present danger still applicable?5 8 Or were the circumstances
left totally to the discretion of the trial court?
The legal justification for a gag order covering a defendant and the
standards to be used in deciding whether to issue it were the questions
left unanswered by the opinion in Sheppard. Nevertheless, the Court
did expressly sanction the proscription of a defendant's extrajudicial
statements.
Appellate Courts Review Gag Orders Covering
Criminal Defendants
Since the decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell,59 three appellate courts
have considered the problem of gag orders covering criminal defend-
the release of leads to the press, the Court recommended control of information
furnished to the press by police, witnesses, defense counsel, and prosecutors. The
accused is not mentioned. See id. at 359.
54. Witnesses are not within these disciplinary powers, although they also were
included in the Sheppard dicta. See id. at 361.
55. For an article commenting on a court's lack of authority to control the
defendant and witnesses see 45 N.C.L. Rav. 183, 199 (1966).
56. 384 U.S. at 361.
57. Although the Court does refer to the reasonable likelihood test, it is authorized
only as the standard to use in deciding to utilize the alternative remedies of continuance,
change in venue, and sequestration. See id. at 362-63. There has been some misunder-
standing of this dicta; at least one federal court believed that Sheppard authorized the
reasonable likelihood test as the standard for gag orders. See King v. Jones, 319 F.
Supp. 653, 660 (N.D. Ohio 1970). Even the American Bar Association initially misread
the Sheppard opinion. See Roney, The Bar Answers the Challenge, 62 A.B.A.J. 60, 61
(1976).
58. See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
59. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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ants.60 While the factual situations giving rise to the issuance of these
protective orders differed, the cases can be compared and contrasted in
terms of the legal justifications provided for proscribing the defendant's
extrajudicial statements and the substantive prerequisites articulated for
issuance of an order.
United States v. Tijerina
The first decision in a federal court finding a justification for the
inclusion of a defendant in a protective order came from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In United States v.
Tijerina,6 ' five defendants of Mexican-American descent were arrested
for assaulting federal forest rangers. Because of the public interest in
the arrests, defense counsel suggested that extrajudicial statements be
proscribed.62  In connection with the pending trial, the federal district
judge convened a pretrial conference with all parties and counsel
present. The pretrial publicity was discussed, and a broad protective
order was issued which applied to the defendants as well as to the
attorneys and witnesses .6  Apparently, neither the defendants nor their
counsel made any effort to object to the constitutionalty of the order.6"
As issued, the order proscribed extrajudicial statements concerning the
jury, the merits of the case, the evidence, the witnesses, or the rulings of
the court. A few days later, several of the defendants, apparently
willfully and with comprehension of the consequences, violated the
order by making public comments on proscribed matters.65
In upholding the contempt conviction rendered for violation of the
order, the Tenth Circuit held that because there had been no effort to
have the order modified and no objection to its issuance, the order had
to be obeyed "until reversed for error by orderly review." 66 Thus the
actual holding of the court in Tijerina was that collateral attack on the
contempt citation was barred. In other words, a defendant cannot
60. See Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); Hamilton v.
Municipal Ct., 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985
(1969).
61. 407 F.2d 349 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
62. See United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 662-63 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 990 (1969). The fact that defense counsel requested the order may have had
some influence on the outcome of the decision. The case is still important, however, for
the justification announced for the issuance of gag orders and for the test utilized to
decide whether the order was required. See notes 68-79 & accompanying text infra.
63. See 412 F.2d at 663 n.1.
64. See id. at 663.
65. See id. at 665-66.
66. Id. at 666.
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attack the constitutionality of an order in a review by an appellate court
of a conviction for violation of the order.0 7
The court, however, went beyond this actual holding to address the
general problem of gag orders as applied to criminal defendants. No-
ting that the problem at hand was "unusual" 68 in that the defendants
were arguing that they could not b& prejudiced by their own state-
ments,69 the court nevertheless relied exclusively on the Estes-Sheppard
rule that the fair trial right takes precedence over first amendment
freedoms. 70  A new justification was established, however, for the inclu-
sion of the defendant in a gag order. The court substituted the public
interest in a fair trial for the interest of the accused. 71  The term "fair
trial" as used in Estes v. Texas72 referred to the accused's rights under
the sixth amendment, the guarantee to him of a trial by an impartial
jury. In Tijerina, the court argued that the fair trial guarantee applies
to the prosecution as well as to the defense. 78 Whether the addition of
the public interest 74 was an interpolation of the dicta in Sheppard v.
Maxwel 75 or merely an original interpretation is unclear. What is
important, however, is the shift in the justification for a gag order
67. Judge Breitenstein, in Tijerina, cited another of his own opinions as authority
for this holding. See Dunn v. United States, 388 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1968). What
emerges from a reading of all the judge's authority is that the cases bar collateral attack
in the context of injunctions in labor disputes. None deals directly with first amendment
rights. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947); Howat v.
Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189 (1922); Dunn. v. United States, 388 F.2d 511, 513 (10th Cir.
1968). The Seventh Circuit has rejected the Tijerina position and held that the
collateral bar rule is not appropriate in gag order cases. See In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111,
114 (7th Cir. 1971). Nevertheless, by basing his decision on the collateral bar rule,
Judge Breitenstein avoided the issue of whether the contempt power is an available
remedy to punish a defendant for violation of a gag order.
68. See United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 990 (1969).
69. See Annot., 5 A.L.R. Fed. 935, 939 (1969). Defendants were inferring a
right to voluntarily effect their own trial. This conclusion is made clear by the reliance
on People v. Massie, 66 Cal. 2d 899, 428 P.2d 869, 59 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967). In
Massie, the facts involved admission of evidence of a sound film depicting the defendant
as admitting his guilt. Because the statement was voluntary, the court held that no
constitutional right was infringed. See id. at 909, 428 P.2d at 876, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 740.
70. See 412 F.2d at 667; see note 40 & accompanying text supra.
71. See 412 F.2d at 666.
72. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
73. See 412 F.2d at 666.
74. The court uses the terms "government interest" and "public interest" inter-
changeably. Probably any interest the prosecution, representing the government, has in
a fair trial can be distinguished from the public interest. One state court recognized
three distinct interests under the sixth amendment: the interests of the accused in a fair
trial; the interests of the victim; and the interests of the general public in justice. See
Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. Rptr. 83, 90-94 (Ct. App. 1968).
75. 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966); see note 50 & accompanying text supra.
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covering the defendant. The Tijerina decision announced that by in-
cluding the accused in a protective order, the trial judge is expected to
strike a balance between the defendant's rights under the first amend-
ment and the public interest in securing a fair trial.76 In weighing the
balance in favor of the public interest, the court in Tijerina said, "The
public has an overriding interest that justice be done in a controversy
between the government and individuals. .... -.7
In addition to recognizing a public interest in a fair trial separate
from the right of the defendant, the Tenth Circuit in Tijerina adopted a
new test for deciding when the first amendment rights of a criminal
defendant can be restricted by a gag order. The traditional clear and
present danger test for justifying first amendment restriction was ex-
pressly rejected, and the court adopted in its stead a "reasonable likeli-
hood" standard:78
The order is based on a 'reasonable likelihood' of prejudicial news
which would make difficult the impaneling of an impartial jury and
tend to prevent a fair trial. We believe that a reasonable likeli-
hood suffices. The Supreme Court has never said that a clear and
present danger to the right of a fair trial must exist before a trial
court can forbid extrajudicial statements about the trial. 79
Hamilton v. Municipal Court
A second case considering a gag order covering a defendant was
Hamilton v. Municipal Court. 0 A California court of appeal upheld
a contempt citation issued after a willful violation of an order proscrib-
ing the defendants' extrajudicial statements. The defendants had been
arrested during a demonstration on the Berkeley campus of the Universi-
ty of California. At a pretrial hearing and under the justification of
providing a fair trial, a broad protective order was issued which pros-
cribed public statements by the parties.81 Subsequently, the defendants
called a press conference and issued a statement for release to the media.
Upholding the denial of a writ of prohibition to prevent prosecution for
willful disobedience of the order, the California court of appeal found
that under the clear and present danger test, the order had complied
with the guidelines from Sheppard v. Maxwell."2 "The order. . . was
not merely justified," the court said, "but was required by directions
contained in Sheppard.s3 At no point did the court in Hamilton
discuss a justification for a gag order which includes a defendant.
76. See 412 F.2d at 666.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
81. See id. at 799-800, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 169-70.
82. See id. at 802, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
83. Id.
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United States v. Chase
The last appellate decision considering a gag order covering a
defendant was rendered by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
one year after Tijerina and Hamilton. In United States v. Chase,84 the
defendants were charged with the destruction of selective service
records, and a protective order covering the accused and counsel was
subsequently issued. The defendants appealed the order on constitu-
tional grounds. Deciding on a petition for writ of mandamus and
prohibition, the Seventh Circuit found the order "constitutionally imper-
missible."88
The appellate court in Chase v. Robson did not, however, say that
a gag order on a criminal defendant was per se unconstitutional or that
the contempt power was not an available remedy to control a defend-
ant's extrajudicial statements. Rather, the court looked to the facts of
the case and found that because the publicity was seven months old, the
gag order was not justified. 6 According to the opinion in Chase, the
order was unconstitutional under either the clear and present danger test
or the reasonable likelihood test.87 The court, however, refused to
adopt either of these substantive standards. Instead, the brief opinion
set forth two criteria for determining the constitutionality of a gag order.
First, there must be specific findings that the speech is a "serious and
imminent threat" to a fair trial.8 Second, the gag order must be so
narrowly drawn as to prohibit only speech that will affect these fair trial
rights .8  This two-part test provided considerably more protection to
first amendment rights than did either the reasonable likelihood test of
Tijerina or the clear and present danger test as applied in Hamilton."
Although the test and the result were different from those in
Tijerina, the opinion in Chase impliedly agreed with the court in Tijer-
ina that the government has fair trial rights. The court in Chase
84. 309 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
85. 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. For a Sixth Circuit decision requiring a similar substantive test for a
gag order in a civil action see CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 240 (6th Cir. 1975).
89. See 435 F.2d at 1061.
90. The court in Hamilton did discuss and reject the overbreadth argument with
regard to that specific gag order. Therefore, impliedly, the court adopted overbreadth as
an element to be considered in addition to the clear and present danger test. See 270
Cal. App. 2d at 802, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
The dissent in Hamilton agreed with the majority on the adoption of the clear and
present danger test, but would have struck down the order on the basis that the
requirements of the test were not satisfied and also on the basis of the order's
overbreadth and uncertainty. See id. at 804-05, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73 (Draper, P.J.,
dissenting).
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weighed the defendant's first amendment rights against the rights of
both the defendant and the government in a fair trial,91 suggesting that
the government's interest was equated with or merged into that of the
defendant under the sixth amendment.
Summary
The positions of these three appellate courts can be summarized as
follows. In establishing a justification for the proscription of a defend-
ant's speech, the Tenth9" and the Sevenths3 Circuits appear to sanction
the use of the contempt power based upon the public interest in a fair
trial. Both courts found that under some circumstances this public
interest would be sufficiently great to justify issuance of a gag order
proscribing the defendant's speech. They did not, however, analyze the
scope and nature of this public interest. The California appellate court
ignored the problem of a justification for the order and simply relied on
Sheppard v. Maxwell.9"
The three appellate courts are in total disagreement as to what
substantive test must be met before a gag order proscribing the defend-
ant's extrajudicial statements can be issued. The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the order on the basis
that the defendant's statements were reasonably likely to interfere with
the public interest in a fair trial.95 The California court reached the
same conclusion using the traditional clear and present danger test.96
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit required that there be
factual findings that the defendant's statements would be an imminent
threat to a fair trial9 7 and that the order be so narrowly drawn as to
proscribe only speech that would affect fair trial rights. 98 None of these
appellate decisions addressed the issue of the procedural requirements
necessary to protect the defendant's rights. 99
91. See 435 F.2d at 1061. The court did not indicate whether the government
right in a fair trial is a public or a prosecutorial right. See note 74 supra.
92. See United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969).
93. See Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
94. See Hamilton v. Municipal Ct., 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 802, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168,
171 (1969).
95. See 412 F.2d at 666.
96. See 270 Cal. App. 2d at 801-02, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
97. See 435 F.2d at 1061.
98. See id. The court in Hamilton also impliedly adopted this requirement. See
note 90 supra.
99. One decision considering gag orders on public prosecutors did discuss and
reject the procedural requirement for a hearing. See In re Kinlein, 15 Md. App. 625,
638, 292 A.2d 749, 757 (1972). At least one case considering press gag orders has
alluded to the procedural problem. See Rosato v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. App. 3d 190,
207-08, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 438 (1975).
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Analysis of the Justification for a Gag Order
Covering the Defendant
Since the decisions in Tijerina,100 Hamilton,' and Chase,102 there
has been no appellate litigation involving gag orders covering criminal
defendants. These three appellate decisions do not conclusively estab-
lish a rationale for a gag order infringing the accused's first amendment
freedoms. Thus, the question of the legal justification for such an order
is left largely unanswered. 0 3
In analyzing the legal basis for the issuance of a gag order covering
the defendant, it is necessary to consider both the court's justification for
issuing the order and the court's use of the contempt power to enforce
the order. The relationship between the justification for the order and
the enforcement power is complex. For clarification, it is helpful to
consider the court's control of the defendant's extrajudicial statements as
a two-step process. First, the court issues the order proscribing the
defendant's extrajudicial comments. At this point, the defendant may
test the constitutionality of the order in an appellate proceeding. If the
appellate court upholds the order, it should advance some legal justifica-
tion for the order, such as the public interest notion advanced in
Tijerina. Thus, in upholding the constitutionality of the order, the
appellate court will have directly affirmed the trial court's legal justifica-
tion for issuing the order.
Often, however, the defendant does not appeal the order after it is
issued. Instead, the defendant violates the order by making comments
on matters proscribed. 10 4 The trial court is then required to proceed to
the second step in the proseription of the defendant's speech, namely the
enforcement of the order. The court performs this function by using its
contempt power to cite the accused for violation of the order. If the
defendant appeals the contempt citation, the court hearing the case
decides whether the contempt power was available as a remedy to
enforce the order. Since the law allows enforcement of lawful orders
only,0 5 the contempt citation should be affirmed only if the actual order
was justified. Therefore, in upholding the citation, the court by indirec-
tion affirms that a legal justification for the order existed. On the other
100. 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
101. 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
102. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
103. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); see notes 52-56 & accompany-
ing text supra.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969); Hamilton
v. Municipal Ct., 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1969).
105. The federal law provides that the court can use the contempt power to punish
"[d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or com-
mand." 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1970) (emphasis added).
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hand, if the court overturns the contempt citation, it impliedly asserts
that no legal justification ever existed for the gag order. This analysis
compels the conclusion that the constitutionality of the actual order and
the contempt power used to enforce the order is relevant to the legal
justification for proscribing the defendant's extrajudicial statements by
means of a gag order. This note will address these interrelated issues in
turn, discussing first the use of the contempt power to enforce the order
and second the actual justification for the order.
The Contempt Power
The first contempt conviction for media comment in the United
States occurred before the Constitution was ratified.10 6  Since then, the
use of the contempt power by state and federal courts for this purpose
has had an irregular history. 0 7 Although the late 19th and early 20th
centuries saw an increased use of the power,108 in the middle part of this
century, the Supreme Court repeatedly rejected the use of the contempt
power to punish for public comment on pending cases.109 By 1965, an
article in the Columbia Law Review concluded:
In broad terms, the message that these decisions ,[Bridges v. Califor-
nia to Rideau v. Louisiana] carry is that publicity before or during
trial may seriously prejudice the rights of an accused, but that these
abuses ought, so far as possible, to be dealt with by some means
other than summary contempt." 0
Although the Court's decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell left unclear
the source of a trial court's authority to proscribe the defendant's
extrajudicial statements, the Court never expressly or impliedly suggest-
ed that the contempt power was an available remedy."' Furthermore,
studies made on the free press fair trial problem following Sheppard
unanimously concluded that a trial court's contempt power should not
extend to the defendant prior to trial,"' the very time when gag orders
106. Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States to the Federal
Contempt Statute, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 401, 409-10 (1928).
107. See id. at 409. See also Nelles & King, supra note 9.
108. See Nelles & King, supra note 9, at 542-62.
109. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
110. Taylor, Crime Reporting and Publicity of Criminal Proceedings, 66 COLuM. L.
R V. 34, 39 (1966).
111. The Court said only that the source was "concededly" within the trial court's
power. See 384 U.S. at 361.
112. Following the assassination of President Kennedy, four independent reports
were issued containing recommendations for the control of publicity. Two of the studies
were commenced prior to the Court's decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell, but none was
published until after the decision. To a great degree the recommendations of these
studies were based upon interpretations of the Court's dicta, and their conclusions must
be studied with the understanding that each separately protected the interests it repre-
sented. These studies dealt only peripherally with the defendant's position. Neverthe-
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are issued."'
The most widely known of these studies is the Reardon Report,
issued by the American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Fair
Trial and Free Press. 114  It recommended restrictions on the statements
of law enforcement officers, court officials, and attorneys."' The
comments to the final draft, however, expressly stated that criminal
defendants should be excluded from any restrictions during the pretrial
period." 6  The report said, "[T]he proposed restrictions do not-and
probably could not-apply to the defendant himself, who does not have
the same fiduciary obligation to the administration of justice as his
attorney."' "17  A court, of course, can enforce the proscription of extra-
less none of the four recommended protective orders covered the defendant during the
period prior to trial.
The recommendations of the Kaufman Report and the Reardon Report are dealt
with separately in this note. See text accompanying notes 114-20 infra. See Judicial
Conference of the United States Comm. on the Operation of the Jury System, Report on
the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1969), as amended, 51 F.R.D. 135
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Kaufman Report]; ABA ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL
AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Final Draft,
1968) [hereinafter cited as REARDON REPORT II]; ABA ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL
AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Tent. Draft,
1966) [hereinafter cited as REARDON REPORT I].
The report issued by the American Newspaper Publishers Association was primarily
concerned with protecting the unrestricted right to freedom of the press. Predictably,
the report concluded that traditional safeguards were adequate under all circumstances,
and no protective orders should be issued. See AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS
ASS'N, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1967).
The report issued by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York was
hesitant to sanction pretrial protective orders on any trial participant. It stated: "The
prospect, in this pretrial period, of judges of various criminal courts of high and low
degree sitting as petty tyrants, handing down sentences of fine and imprisonment for
contempt of court against lawyers, policemen, and reporters and editors, is not attractive.
Such an innovation might well cut prejudicial publicity to a minimum. But at what a
price!" SPECIAL COMM. ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR
TRIAL, FINAL REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION 39 (1967).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 990 (1969); United States v. Chase, 309 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ill. 1970). No case
involving gag orders covering the defendant has dealt exclusively with the period during
trial.
114. See REARDON REPORT II, supra note 112.
115. See id., Approved Draft of Standards § 1.1, at 1-3; id. § 2.1, at 4-6; id.,
Commentary on Approved Draft § 1.1, at 17-20.
116. See id., Commentary on Approved Draft § 1.1, at 20.
117. Id. See also REARDON REPORT I, supra note 112, Commentary on Specific
Recommendations § 3.5, at 142-43. The report does recommend restricting the extraju-
dicial statements of the accused during the course of an ongoing trial. While the report
makes a distinction between pretrial gag orders and restrictive orders during trial, the
rationale for this distinction is unclear, Authority supports the right of a judge to
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judicial comments made by prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforce-
ment officers, and court officials simply because they are officers of the
court. The defendant, however, is not an officer of the court, and the
court cannot place sanctions upon the defendant by analogizing him to
other trial participants." 8 Therefore, a gag order covering the defend-
ant can be enforced by the contempt power only if the restriction is
based on other legal justification. The Reardon Report strongly sug-
gested that no such justification exists.
Following the Reardon Report, the Kaufman Committee on the
Operation of the Jury System issued a report 1 9 specifically recommend-
ing adoption of the section of the Reardon Report which excluded
defendants from pretrial protective orders.120
control the defendant's speech in the courtroom. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970). See also 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1970). It is difficult to understand, however,
how the contempt power is available to restrict the defendant's out-of-court statements
during the trial when it is not available to do so prior to the trial. Furthermore, it would
appear that with jury sequestration during the trial, a gag order at that time would not be
necessary.
Two authors interpreted the Reardon Report as recommending no restrictions on the
defendant's extrajudicial statements even during the trial. See A. FRIENDLY & R.
GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 136 (1967). This conclusion appears to be in
conflict with the recommendations contained in section 3.5(c) of the report.
In 1965, Senator Wayne Morse introduced a bill in the United States Senate which
would have expanded the court's power over the defendant's extrajudicial statements to
the pretrial period. It stated: "It shall constitute a contempt of court for any employee
of the United States, or for any defendant or his attorney or the agent of either, to
furnish or make available for publication information not already properly filed with the
court which might affect the outcome of any pending criminal litigation, except evidence
that has already been admitted at trial. Such contempt shall be punished by a fine of
not more than $1,000." The bill died in the Judiciary Committee. See S. 290, 89th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1965).
118. See 45 N.C.L. REV. 183, 199 (1966). This distinction between a defendant's
and an attorney's relationship to the court has been recognized in other contexts. See,
e.g., Farr v. Superior CL, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1011 (1972) (court's contempt power extended only to its own officers and
counsel appearing before it). For an analysis of the distinction between the court's
power to restrain the speech of an attorney and its power to restrain the speech of a pri-
vate citizen see Polk v. State Bar, 374 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Tex. 1974). For an example
of a state statute allowing its courts to discipline its own officers see CAL. CoDR Civ.
PRoc. § 128(5) (West 1954 & Supp. 1976).
It should be noted that a witness's relationship to the court is the same as a
defendant's. The report therefore recommends restriction of witnesses only during the
course of an ongoing trial. See REARDON REPORT I, supra note 112, Commentary on
Specific Recommendations § 3.5(c), at 142-43.
119. See supra note 112. The Kaufman Committee was appointed by the Judicial
Conference of the United States.
120. See id. at 407. The Kaufman Report recommends proscription of extrajudicial
statements by parties and witnesses during the conduct of judicial proceedings. See id. at
409. It is unclear whether a judicial proceeding means something broader than an
ongoing trial.
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Together these two reports represent the opinions of some of the
nation's leading jurists, yet the recommendations of these reports have
been ignored. Protective orders covering the accused have been issued
following the defendant's arrest, and the contempt power has been
utilized to enforce these orders.
In sum, the United States Supreme Court has never authorized the
use of the contempt power during any stage of the judicial process to
punish a defendant for violation of a gag order. Legal experts have
unanimously concluded the contempt power should not be extended to
cover the defendant, at least during the period prior to the actual trial.12'
Appellate courts considering gag orders covering the defendant have not
directly addressed the contempt issue.' 2 The only conclusion to be
drawn from these facts is that the use of the contempt power as a means
to enforce a gag order covering the defendant is suspect. With the
court's power to enforce the order in doubt, the question remains as to
what justification, if any, exists to support this power.
The Public Interest
The only justification that has been suggested12 for including a
defendant in a gag order is that there is a public interest in a fair trial
which supersedes the defendant's first amendment rights. The origin of
this public interest in a fair trial is obscure. Although it is not a right
expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, the principle that the public
has an interest in maintaining our system of justice underlies the entire
document. This principle was first voiced by the United States Supreme
Court in 1949, in a situation unrelated to the issuance of gag orders. 4
The Court said: "[-D]efendant's valued right to have his trial completed
by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the
public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments."' 2'
In 1967, the concept of the public interest in fair trials was extend-
ed by the Tenth Circuit to a free press-fair trial context. 2 6  The
121. See notes 112-121 & accompanying text supra.
122. See note 67 & accompanying text supra.
123. United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
990 (1969).
124. See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949). The case involved a court martial
proceeding in Nazi Germany at the close of World War II. The allied armies were
rapidly advancing into enemy territory, and troop movements necessitated the declaration
of a mistrial after jeopardy had attached. In allowing the conviction arrived at in the
second court martial, the Supreme Court relied upon the public's interest in "just
judgments." Subsequently, this principle has been repeatedly applied in justifying retrials
in violation of a strict construction of the jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.
125. Id. at 689.
126. See Mares v. United States, 383 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1967).
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defendant's out-of-court confession, held inadmissible at trial, was sub-
sequently published in a local newspaper. Declaring a mistrial, Judge
Breitenstein spoke of the public's "overriding interest" in securing jus-
tice, expressing the idea that it is contrary to the public interest to have
the case tried in the media.127 One year later, Judge Breitenstein cited
his own opinion and again relied upon the public's "overriding interest"
to uphold the contempt conviction in United States v. Tijerina.128
The public interest in a fair trial is a semantic blank. Three
definitions of this term, however, arguably allow its use as a justification
for issuing a gag order covering the defendant. The first comtemplates
an interest which demands that the defendant's rights under the sixth
amendment be protected from all who would infringe on them, includ-
ing the defendant himself, and that the court's duty is to protect the
interests of both the public and the defendant by proscribing the defend-
ant's extrajudicial statements. A second definition of the public interest
in a fair trial is a prosecutorial right to a fair trial similar to, but outside
of, the sixth amendment and based upon the theory that the prosecution
and the defense are entitled to equal treatment. A third definition
centers on a general public interest in the fair administration of justice,
which the courts have the inherent duty and power to insure. While it
is this author's conclusion that none of these possible definitions pro-
vides an adequate justification for the infringement of the defendant's
first amendment rights, each of these three definitions will be considered
in turn.
Defining the public interest as an interest in the exercise of the
defendant's rights under the sixth amendment, and using this definition
to justify the issuance of a gag order covering the defendant, requires the
further assumption that the court's function is to force the defendant to
choose his fair trial rights over his rights in free speech. In other words,
the conclusion must be drawn that the court's role is to protect the
defendant from himself.
This theory is based upon the premise that a court's function is
paternalistic. When a defendant requests the courts protection, 129 this
notion is legitimate. However, when the trial court sua sponte issues a
gag order, it assumes too protective a role. 30  The assumption that a
127. See id. at 809.
128. 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
129. See, e.g., Allegrezza v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal. App. 3d 948, 950, 121 Cal. Rptr.
245, 246 (1975).
130. It is the attorney's role to protect the accused. In most cases, the defendant
will be represented by counsel whose duty it is to advise the accused against making
incriminating statements. Most defense attorneys will advise their clients against
making any statements at all to the press. Clearly this function is the attorney's, not the
court's.
If the defendant is not covered by a protective order when defense counsel is, the
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court, without the consent of the defendant, can infringe upon the
accused's first amendment guarantees is contrary to all authority. The
United States Supreme Court has said that a defendant, not the court,
has the right to waive his constitutional guarantees. 13 1  Consequently,
when the court proscribes the defendant's speech for his own protection,
it infringes not only his first amendment rights, but also his privilege of
waiver.
When the defendant wishes to waive his sixth amendment rights in
order to expose his ideas to the public for national debate, this waiver
should generally be recognized. The only requirement is that the
waiver be knowingly and intelligently made. 32 In some instances this
requirement may be impossible to meet without the advice of an attor-
ney. 133  Moreover, the accused must be competent to exercise an in-
formed judgment.13  Therefore, in some cases the trial court will have
to make a determination as to the defendant's capacity. Authority
suggests that the hearing to determine the defendant's competence to
stand trial will not suffice to determine also the defendant's competence
to waive a constitutional right.13 5  Consequently, if there is a question
of the accused's competence, the minimum requirement is that the judge
convene a separate hearing to determine the defendant's capacity to
waive his sixth amendment rights. When the waiver is knowingly,
intelligently, and competently made, however, there is no basis for
denying the accused the opportunity to waive his right to a fair trial.
This privilege of waiver has been guaranteed the criminal defend-
ant with respect to other provisions of the Bill of Rights. The United
States Supreme Court has held that an accused may plead guilty,3 6 that
problem of counsel acting as his client's agent could arise. Defense counsel's conduct,
however, would be restrained under the American Bar Association rules on trial
publicity. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE DR
7-107. This code would similarly preclude the attorney from using the defendant as his
agent. See id.
131. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). The Court said, "'When
there is no constitutional or statutory mandate, and no public policy prohibiting, an
accused may waive any privilege which he is given the right to enjoy.'" Id. at 310,
quoting Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 72 (1904).
The Court also stated, "'In every substantial sense our constitutional provisions in
respect to jury trials in criminal cases are for the protection of the interests of the
accused, and as such they may, in a limited and guarded measure, be waived by the party
sought to be benefited.'" Id. at 296, quoting Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801,
821 (1st Cir. 1908).
132. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
133. Id. at 748 n.6.
134. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
135. See Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam) (distinction
between competence necessary to stand trial and competence necessary to waive assist-
ance of counsel). See also Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973).
136. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 311 (1930).
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he may waive the right to the assistance of counsel, 13 7 and that he may
act as his own attorney.138 The sixth amendment provides that the
accused shall have a public trial, but under some circumstances the
defendant may waive that right in his own best interests. 80 The sixth
amendment also provides that the trial shall be in "the district wherein
the crime shall have been committed," yet it is well established that a
defendant can relinquish that right and move for a change of venue.140
Most important to this discussion, the defendant can waive the right to a
jury trial.141 In allowing him to waive this right, the Court has already
allowed the accused the choice of waiving his right to trial by an
impartial jury. The accused's rights should also extend to waiving this
privilege in the name of his first amendment freedoms.141 Clearly the
mandate from the Supreme Court is to allow the defendant to waive this
privilege, not to permit a court to protect the defendant by infringing
upon his first amendment rights.
A second definition of the public interest in a fair trial is that it is a
prosecutorial right based upon an equal right to a fair trial. 43  While
the sixth amendment expressly applies only to the accused, it can be
argued that the prosecution has an independent nonconstitutional inter-
est in fair trial rights. Under this definition, a gag order covering the
defendant is justified on the ground that to muzzle the prosecution and
not to muzzle the defendant arguably works an unfair burden on the
state.
This theory is made questionable by statistics showing that the
preponderant share of the manipulation of the media is undertaken by
the police and the prosecutor. 44 Prosecutors have an ongoing relation-
ship with the media and a better opportunity to make anonymous leaks
137. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 281 (1942).
138. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
139. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965).
140. See Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 733 (9th Cir. 1963); FED. R. Clam.
P. 21.
141. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942).
142. The court has said, "Mhe procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights are not
to be treated as mechanical rigidities. What were contrived as protections for the
accused should not be turned into fetters." Id. at 279.
143. This definition can be supported by the language used in United States v.
Tijerina and Chase v. Robson. In Tijerina, the Tenth Circuit said, "The concept of a
fair trial applies both to the prosecution and the defense." 412 F.2d at 666. In Chase,
the Seventh Circuit said, "In the absence of a clear showing that an exercise of those
first amendment rights will interfere with the rights of the government and the defend-
ants for a fair trial, we reject this prior restraint on first amendment freedoms." 435
F.2d at 1061.
144. See REARDON RiEPORT I, supia note 112, General Commentary, at 26. See also
id., App. B. Tables I-I1, at 194-227. It should be noted that these statistics are not up to
date.
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to newsmen. The Reardon Report noted, "As is true throughout the
criminal process, the principle source of potentially prejudicial state-
ments. . . is the public official, whose words have the ring of authority
and authenticity."' 14 5 The context of the report makes it clear that the
term "public official" refers to police officers and prosecutors.14  Be-
cause of the prosecutor's access to the media, the defendant can be
disadvantaged, 147 particularly if he cannot post bail and is awaiting trial
in jail. While theoretically the incarcerated prisoner has access to the
public through the mails and by telephone, in reality these privileges are
seriously limited.
More important, the idea that a gag order infringing the defend-
ant's first amendment freedoms is justified because of a superseding
prosecutorial interest in fair trial rights is not constitutionally justified.
The sixth amendment applies only to the accused.' 48  While concededly
the prosecution may have some independent interest in a fair trial, such
an interest is not sufficient to infringe the defendant's freedom of
speech, one of his most cherished constitutional rights.
The third definition of a public interest in a fair trial which argua-
bly provides a justification for the issuance of a gag order covering the
defendant is a general public interest in the fair administration of justice.
Some of the language in Sheppard v. Maxwell'49 indicates the Court was
relying on this definition in authorizing protective orders covering the
accused. The Court said, "The courts must take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside
interferences." 150
Certainly the court has the necessary power and the duty to control
the speech and behavior of the accused in the courtroom.' 5 ' Using the
theory that there is a general public interest in the fair administration of
justice to justify applying gag orders to criminal defendants extends this
power to statements made outside the courtroom. There is no justifica-
tion for such an extension of this power. To allow the court to
proscribe the defendant's extrajudicial statements under this theory is to
elevate a general fair trial right to a position superior to that of the
defendant's constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech on the
145. Id. at 26.
146. See id.
147. For a recent case discussing the defendant's disadvantaged position see Chica-
go Council v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975).
148. The sixth amendment requires: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ." (emphasis
added).
149. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
150. Id. at 363.
151. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1970).
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mere conjecture that there may be difficulty in impaneling an impartial
jury. In controlling courtroom speech, a judge is disciplining past or
present expression. In proscribing extrajudicial comment under a gag
order, the court is infringing first amendment rights prospectively. While
the court has the right to protect its actual processes, this power does not
extend to infringing constitutional rights on the possibility that some
future impairment of its processes may occur. Such an extension would
grant to the court an inherent power without effective restraints on
judicial abuse.152  Therefore a general public interest in justice should
not create this inherent power in the judiciary and should not be used as
an excuse to infringe upon the constitutionally protected first amend-
ment rights of the accused.
Thus, each of the three definitions of the public interest in a fair
trial fails to provide a justification, constitutional or otherwise, for the
issuance of a gag order covering the defendant. The public interest is
neither in forcing the defendant to waive his first amendment freedoms
nor in allowing some general prosecutorial or judicial interest to defeat
the defendant's constitutionally protected rights in free speech. If there
is a legitimate public interest in a fair trial, it is in impaneling an
impartial jury without infringing any of the defendant's constitutional
rights. The court's duty is to use the least restrictive means available to
obtain an impartial jury, infringing the accused's rights only to the
extent necessary to achieve this end. 5 3 Therefore, the trial judge must
apply the traditional remedies available to secure sixth amendment
rights.15 4
A court has a battery of alternative remedies available to assure
that the jury will not be affected by prejudicial publicity. If pretrial
publicity has endangered the right to a fair trial in the locale of the
152. The defendant's comments are also an important element in the formation of
public opinion, which acts as a restraint on judicial power. The Court has said, 'The
knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of
public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power." In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) (footnote omitted).
153. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). The Court in Shelton said,
"iE]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved." Id. at 488.
Several authors have suggested that in the extreme case, one alternative is to release
the defendant. See e.g., Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal Defendant Against
Adverse Press Coverage, 13 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 1, 22 (1971); Warren & Abell, supra
note 4, at 98.
154. For an excellent discussion of these traditional remedies of change of venue,
voir dire, continuance, admonition, jury sequestration, and waiver of jury trial see Stanga,
Judicial Protection of the Criminal Defendant Against Adverse Press Coverage, 13 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1 (1971). The Reardon Report recommended an expanded use of these
remedies. See REARDON REPORT I, supra note 112, General Commentary, at 73-74.
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crime, the court or the defendant can move for a change of venue.
Second, the court can deal with prejudicial publicity by careful voir dire
examination. The requirements for an impartial juror are not that he
be totally unfamiliar with the defendant and the crime.' 55 The Su-
preme Court has said:
It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of
the facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread
and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be
expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and
scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have
formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case.
This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere
existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence
of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption
of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impos-
sible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impres-
sion or opinion and render a verdict based on evidence presented
in court. 56
Third, recourse can be had to the other traditional remedies of continu-
ance, waiver of jury trial, and jury sequestration.
In conclusion, the public interest, however defined, is not a legaljustification for the issuance of a gag order covering the defendant.
Courts are not paternal institutions that can infringe a defendant's first
amendment rights for his own protection. A court ought not to pre-
clude the defendant from exercising a knowing and intelligent waiver of
his sixth amendment rights in the name of his first amendment free-
doms. Furthermore, any general public interest in fair trial rights is not
sufficiently compelling to justify the infringement of the defendant's
constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech. Therefore, the
public interest does not justify the proscription of the defendant's extra-
judicial statements by means of a gag order.
Substantive and Procedural Standards
Although the justification for the issuance of a gag order prohibit-
ing the defendant's extrajudicial statements is unclear, Sheppard v. Max-
well'1 7 seems to sanction the proscription of the defendant's extrajudi-
cial statements. 158 Therefore, trial courts will continue to utilize the gag
order as an available remedy against publicity. A question remains as
to what minimum substantive and procedural requirements are neces-
sary before a trial judge is justified in issuing a gag order applicable to
the defendant's speech.
155. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961).
156. Id.
157. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
158. See id. at 361.
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Substantive Requirements
It is agreed that rights guaranteed under the first amendment are
not absolute.' Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has said, "[a]ny prior
restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption'
against its constitutional validity." 160  Given this directive, a criminal
defendant's extrajudicial statements should be proscribed only under the
most compelling circumstances.
Beginning in 1919, the Surpeme Court traditionally authorized the
clear and present danger test to determine when rights under the first
amendment could be restricted.' 61 This test was first applied in cases
involving federal espionage laws, 62 state criminal syndicalism, 6 ' and
state anti-insurrection laws.'6 In 1941, however, the clear and present
danger test was adopted as the standard to determine whether media
comment on a pending case was a sufficient threat to a fair trial to
justify a gag order.' The Supreme Court has never addressed itself to
a substantive test for the issuance of a gag order. 66 While some
appellate courts continue to use the clear and present danger test, 67
there seems to be a trend toward issuing gag orders when the court finds
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant's speech will
interfere with the public interest in a fair trial.'6 8
Basing a gag order on a clear and present danger test could provide
adequate protection to the defendant's rights if the test were in fact
properly applied. As the dissenting opinion in Hamilton v. Municipal
Court' 6 noted, the court must show "past or threatened events to estab-
lish the requisite degree of clarity and imminence of danger ....
159. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1962). See also New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
160. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
161. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
162. See id.
163. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
164. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
165. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). For the evolution of the
clear and present danger test see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also Comment, Clear and Present
Danger-Full Circle, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 385 (1974).
166. See note 57 & accompanying text supra.
167. See In re Kinlein, 15 Md. App. 625, 630, 292 A.2d 749, 753 (1972).
168. See United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 990 (1969); Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 163, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 242
(1973). In Younger, however, the court noted that a reasonable likelihood test might
not be sufficient when applied to the defendant himself, and suggested that a clear and
present danger test is necessary. See id. at 163 n.36, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
169. 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
170. Id. at 805, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (Draper, P.J., dissenting).
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In reality, however, at least one appellate court has applied the clear and
present danger test without sufficient factual evidence of the order's
necessity.' 7 .
The reasonable likelihood test does not under any circumstances
provide adequate protection for the defendant's first amendment free-
doms. To base a gag order on a finding that the exercise of the
defendant's right to free speech is reasonably likely to interfere with the
public interest in a fair trial is to enable a judge to issue a protective
order under almost any circumstances. Clearly such a standard does
not provide adequate protection for the rights of the accused and
seriously threatens the principles upon which first amendment freedoms
rest. A more stringent test is required.
Whatever the nomenclature, no protective order infringing upon a
defendant's rights under the first amendment should be issued unless a
court can clearly indicate how the speech threatens rights in a fair trial.
Too much emphasis has been placed on the name given a particular test
and too little emphasis on the substance of the threat. The opinion in
Chase v. Robson 17 recognized that a factual approach is necessary. The
first substantive requirement of the court in Chase was that there be
"sufficient specific findings" of a "serious and imminent threat" to fair
trial rights. 173  The factual approach of Chase is imperative in view of
the prospective nature of any gag order. A judge should not be able
merely to assert that a fair trial will be threatened. Since any order is
based upon educated conjecture, a factual basis for this conjecture
should be mandatory.
The Supreme Court has also said, "An order issued in the area of
First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that
will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional
mandate and the essential needs of the public order."'174 The second
part of the substantive test announced in Chase expressed this same
requirement.' 75 The court in Chase said, "[A]n order must be drawn
narrowly so as not to prohibit speech which will not have an effect on the
fair administration of justice along with speech which will have such an
effect."'17 6 In other words, a trial judge should proscribe only those
topics directly relevant to the pending case. A blanket gag order
applied to a criminal defendant is constitutionally impermissible even
when the facts indicate that the right to a fair trial is clearly threatened.
171. See id. at 802, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
172. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
173. See id. at 1061.
174. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968).
See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).
175. See 435 F.2d at 1061.
176. Id.
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In addition to the two-part substantive test authorized in Chase,177
a third test should be met before a gag order is considered: there should
be no less restrictive means available to secure a fair trial. 178  To fulfill
this requirement, the trial court must first make every effort to use the
traditional remedies available to protect sixth amendment rights. It
must be clear that a change in venue has been ineffective. The defend-
ant must refuse to waive his privilege to a jury trial. Facts must clearly
show that voir dire and jury sequestration will be inadequate to secure a
just verdict by an impartial jury. Only after these alternatives have been
explored can the judge consider an order infringing the defendant's first
amendment rights.
Three substantive requirements should therefore be met before a
court may issue a gag order covering the defendant. First, the trial
court must have exhausted the traditional remedies available to protect
the defendant's sixth amendment rights. Second, the facts of the case
must show that extrajudicial comment by the defendant would be a
serious and imminent threat to a fair trial. Finally, the trial judge must
construct the order in the narrowest terms necessary to protect against
this specific threat.
Procedural Requirements
The courts have given no attention to the procedural requirements
necessary to the issuance of a gag order covering a criminal defend-
ant. 7 9 The accused, however, does have substantial procedural rights.
A gag order deprives the defendant of his valued interests in the first
amendment. To effect this deprivation without adequate procedural
safeguards is a clear denial of due process. In Carroll v. President &
Comm'rs of Princess Anne,10 a county court issued an ex parte order
restraining a white supremacist group from holding rallies. In setting
aside the order, the Supreme Court found that the order was unconstitu-
tional because basic first amendment rights had been abridged without
notice or a hearing.' 81 When a trial court sua sponte issues a gag orderinfringing the defendant's first amendment rights, such an order should
also be invalid. 82
177. See notes 173-77 & accompanying text supra.
178. See note 153 & accompanying text supra.
179. See note 99 & accompanying text supra.
180. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
181. See id. at 180-81.
182. For cases establishing the right to procedural due process in other contexts see
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school suspension proceedings); Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation proceedings); Morrissey v. Brew-
er, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation hearings); Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment of wages). The deprivation of a
liberty as fundamental as freedom of speech clearly deserves at least the same protection.
July 1976]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
In February 1976, the American Bar Association Advisory Com-
mittee on Fair Trial and Free Press was scheduled to present for
adoption a recommendation on the procedure to be followed by a court
issuing a gag order. 18 Essentially, the recommendation provided for
notice and a hearing prior to the issuance of the order, for specification
by the trial court of the facts and reasons necessitating the order, and for
an expedited means of judicial review."8 4 This recommendation con-
tains the minimum constitutional requirements for adequate protection
of the defendant's procedural rights. Unfortunately, consideration of
the proposal was deferred until the August 1976 meeting of the Ameri-
can Bar Association.'
Conclusion
It is this author's conclusion that a trial judge should not issue a
gag order covering a criminal defendant for the following reasons. First
a gag order infringes the defendant's first amendment rights. Second,
the public interest in a fair trial does not justify the issuance of an order
including the defendant. Furthermore, until some legal justification is
developed, the contempt power is not available as a remedy to enforce
such an order.
It cannot be ignored, however, that the Supreme Court has express-
ly sanctioned the proscription of extrajudicial statements by parties.' 86
Until the Court clarifies its position, trial judges undoubtedly will con-
tinue to issue gag orders covering defendants. When a court decides to
issue such an order, the minimum substantive requirements should be as
follows:
1. The court should not issue a gag order until it has
exhausted all of the traditional remedies available to secure
sixth amendment rights.
2. The court should issue a gag order covering the de-
fendant only when specific facts indicate a serious and immi-
nent threat to a fair trial.
3. The court should issue the order only in the narrowest
terms necessary to protect that specific threat to a fair trial.
Procedurally, the following should be required:
1. The court should notify the defendant of its intentions
and convene a hearing at which the defendant and his attorney
have an opportunity to be heard.
183. See Recommended Court Procedure to Accommodate Rights of Fair Trial and
Free Press, in Roney, The Bar Answers the Challenge, 62 A.B.A.J. 60, 63-64 (1976).
184. Id. at 60.
185. See American Bar Ass'n Press Release No. 021976, Feb. 1976.
186. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966).
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2. The court should be required to provide in writing the
reasons and the facts necessitating the order.
3. The defendant should be provided with an immediate
opportunity to have the order reviewed.
To muzzle the defendant without his express permission emascu-
lates fundamental Constitutional rights. In the words of Justice Black:
The First Amendment is truly the heart of the Bill of Rights. The
Framers balanced its freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly,
and petition against the needs of a powerful central government,
and decided that in those freedoms lies this nation's only true se-
curity. They were not afraid for men to be free. We should not
be. 87
Ellen 0. Pfaff*
187. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 881 (1960).
188. On June 30, 1976, the United States Supreme Court struck down a gag order
imposed on the press in a sensational murder trial in Lincoln County, Nebraska.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 44 U.S.L.W. 5149 (U.S. June 30, 1976). The Court
expressly refused to assign priorities between sixth and first amendment rights. Id. at
5156. However, the majority ruled that generally a trial judge may not impose prior
restraints on the press even if the judge believes the protective order will help assure
the defendant's right to a fair trial. Refusing to indicate that all press gag orders are
violative of first amendment rights, the Court nonetheless failed to articulate what pro-
cedural and substantive safeguards will be required before such an order can be issued.
Stuart did not address the question of gag orders on criminal defendants. How-
ever, the court said, "Mhe measures a judge takes or fails to take to mitigate the
effects of pretrial publicity-the measures described in Sheppard-may well determine
whether the defendant receives a trial consistent with the requirements of due process."
id. at 5154. The Court thus appears to sanction the continued use of protective orders
on trial participants, including the accused. If indeed this is a proper interpretation of
the case, it is difficult to understand why the first amendment protection given the
press should receive priority over the defendant's right to freedom of speech, also pro-
tected under the first amendment.
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